A Note on University Admission Tests: Simple Theory and Empirical Analysis

Gianni De Fraja, Konstantinos Eleftheriou and Ioakimidis Marilou ()
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Ioakimidis Marilou: Department of Economics, University of Peloponnese, Tripolis Campus, 22100, Tripolis, Greece

The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, 2022, vol. 22, issue 3, 623-632

Abstract: University admission mechanisms are often quite complex. This paper examines one effect of their design on the students’ incentives to exert effort in preparation for the test. We adapt a multi-unit all-pay model of auction to draw the conclusion that abler students work harder: this conclusion is in line with the behaviour of a sample of students who apply for admission to the Greek university system with the complex rules newly introduced in 2013.

Keywords: Greece; multi-unit all-pay auction; university admission (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: I20 I23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2022
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DOI: 10.1515/bejeap-2021-0173

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