Real-effort in the Multilevel Public Goods Game

Catola Marco (), Guarnieri Pietro, Marcon Laura and Spadoni Lorenzo
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Catola Marco: School of Business and Economics, 5211 Maastricht University , Maastricht, The Netherlands
Guarnieri Pietro: Department of Economics and Management, 9310 University of Pisa , Pisa, Italy
Marcon Laura: Department of Economics and Management, 9310 University of Pisa , Pisa, Italy
Spadoni Lorenzo: Department of Economics and Law, 18962 University of Cassino and Southern Lazio , Cassino, Italy

The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, 2024, vol. 24, issue 3, 965-974

Abstract: We investigate the extent to which a real-effort effect and an inequality effect impact individuals’ prosocial behavior in the multilevel public goods game. We explore two symmetrical treatments: one where everyone participates in a preliminary task to obtain their initial endowment, and another where no one does, to assess the real-effort effect. Additionally, we examine two asymmetrical treatments where only individuals from one local group engage in the preliminary task to study the inequality effect. We find evidence that the contribution to the local public good is stable across all treatments, while the contribution to the global public good is significantly lower when both groups perform the preliminary task.

Keywords: multilevel public goods game; online experiment; efficiency; social dilemma (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C90 D71 H4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2024
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DOI: 10.1515/bejeap-2024-0003

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