Addictive Treatment

Jelnov Artyom ()
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Jelnov Artyom: 450039 Ariel University , Ariel, Israel

The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, 2025, vol. 25, issue 4, 1023-1031

Abstract: A treatment prescribed by an incompetent expert can cause long-term damage. However, this damage may not be recognized in the short term. I propose a theoretical model in which an incompetent expert can act dishonestly. Specifically, she can prescribe an improper treatment, which seems to be effective in the short-term but has long-term negative side effects. I show that, surprisingly, the possibility of dishonest behavior may encourage consumers to approach experts and enhance social welfare.

Keywords: addiction; experts; competence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
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DOI: 10.1515/bejeap-2025-0193

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