Hiring Biased Managers: Kant vs. Nash

Lee Jen-Yao, Wang Leonard F.S. and Wu Di ()
Additional contact information
Lee Jen-Yao: Department of International Business, National Kaohsiung University of Science and Technology, Kaohsiung, Taiwan
Wang Leonard F.S.: Center for Global Operation & Enterprise Development, National Kaohsiung University of Science and Technology, Kaohsiung, Taiwan
Wu Di: 12538 Institute of International Economics, School of Economics, Nankai University , Tianjin, China

The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, 2025, vol. 25, issue 4, 1077-1090

Abstract: This paper investigates how firm owners select biased managers under different competition modes with Kantian Optimization principle. We show that in both Cournot competition and Bertrand competition, the optimal strategy under Kantian optimization is to hire relatively conservative managers. This stands in contrast to the findings under Nash optimization, where owners optimally choose relatively aggressive managers. Additionally, we demonstrate that the cross effect of a rival firm’s managerial type on a firm’s expected market size does not influence the owner’s optimal choice of manager type.

Keywords: Kantian principle; biased manager; Cournot competition; Bertrand competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 L21 L22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2025
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1515/bejeap-2024-0444 (text/html)
For access to full text, subscription to the journal or payment for the individual article is required.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bpj:bejeap:v:25:y:2025:i:4:p:1077-1090:n:1008

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.degruyte ... rnal/key/bejeap/html

DOI: 10.1515/bejeap-2024-0444

Access Statistics for this article

The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy is currently edited by Hendrik Jürges and Sandra Ludwig

More articles in The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy from De Gruyter
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Peter Golla ().