Disability Testing and Retirement

Helmuth Cremer, Jean-Marie Lozachmeur and Pierre Pestieau

The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, 2007, vol. 7, issue 1, 34

Abstract: We study the design of retirement and disability policies and illustrate the often observed exit from the labor force of healthy workers through disability insurance schemes. In our model, two types of individuals, disabled and leisure-prone ones, have the same disutility for labor and cannot be distinguished. However, they are not counted in the same way in social welfare. We determine first- and second-best optimal benefit levels and retirement ages. Then we introduce the possibility of testing that can sort out disabled workers from healthy but retirement-prone workers. We show that such testing can increase both social welfare and the rate of participation of elderly workers; in addition disabled workers are better taken care of. It is not optimal to test all applicants. Surprisingly, the (second-best) solution may imply later retirement for the disabled than for the leisure-prone. In that case, the disabled are compensated by higher benefits.

Keywords: disability insurance; social security; retirement age (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

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Working Paper: Disability testing and retirement (2007)
Working Paper: Disability testing and retirement (2006)
Working Paper: Disability Testing and Retirement (2006)
Working Paper: Disability Testing and Retirement (2004)
Working Paper: Disability Testing and Retirement (2004)
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DOI: 10.2202/1935-1682.1608

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