Strategic Use of Copyright Protection to Deter Entry

Jin-Hyuk Kim ()

The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, 2007, vol. 7, issue 1, 19

Abstract: Copyright protection can be used to raise entry barriers by impairing the demand. When there is a complementary market in addition to the copyrighted goods market, the incumbent prefers stronger copyright protection than is needed to maximize the sales profit in the primary market. Although strong protection can reduce demand substitution by copies, it makes it more difficult for the entrant to reach a large audience and become established. In some cases, the entrant may choose to opt out of copyright protection.

Keywords: copyright protection; entry deterrence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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DOI: 10.2202/1935-1682.1765

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