The Default-Prone U.S. Toxic Asset Auction Plan
The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, 2009, vol. 9, issue 1, 1-11
Applying auction theory to the toxic-asset rescue plan currently released by the United States Treasury Department, this paper demonstrates an equilibrium where moderately poor bidders outbid rich bidders in such auctions. After defeating their rich rivals and acquiring the toxic assets, such bidders will default on government-provided loans whenever the toxic assets turn out to be unsalvageable. An alternative mechanism is discussed.
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
https://www.degruyter.com/view/j/bejeap.2009.9.1/b ... .2272.xml?format=INT (text/html)
For access to full text, subscription to the journal or payment for the individual article is required.
Working Paper: The Default-Prone U.S. Toxic Asset Auction Plan (2009)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bpj:bejeap:v:9:y:2009:i:1:n:21
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
Access Statistics for this article
The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy is currently edited by Hendrik Jürges and Sandra Ludwig
More articles in The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy from De Gruyter
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Peter Golla ().