Political and Economic Forces Sustaining Social Security
Casey Mulligan and
Xavier Sala-i-Martin
The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, 2004, vol. 4, issue 1, 1-56
Abstract:
What economic forces create and sustain old-age Social Security as a public program? We relate political, efficiency, and narrative theories of Social Security to empirical results reported in our companion paper in this volume. Political theories, including rational majority voting and pressure group theories, feature a redistributive struggle among groups. "Efficiency theories," which model SS as a full or partial solution to market failure, include optimal redistribution, retirement insurance, and alleviating labor market congestion. Finally we analyze three "narrative" theories.
Date: 2004
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (22)
Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.2202/1538-0637.1289 (text/html)
For access to full text, subscription to the journal or payment for the individual article is required.
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bpj:bejeap:v:advances.4:y:2004:i:1:n:5
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.degruyter.com/journal/key/bejeap/html
DOI: 10.2202/1538-0637.1289
Access Statistics for this article
The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy is currently edited by Hendrik Jürges and Sandra Ludwig
More articles in The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy from De Gruyter
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Peter Golla ().