Contestable Licensing

Zvika Neeman () and Orosel Gerhard Oskar ()
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Orosel Gerhard Oskar: University of Vienna

The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, 2004, vol. 3, issue 1, 1-20

Abstract: We analyze a model of repeated franchise bidding for natural monopoly with contestable licensing -- a franchisee holds an (exclusive) license to operate a franchise until another firm offers to pay more for it. In a world where quality is observable but not verifiable, the simple regulatory scheme we describe combines market-like incentives with regulatory oversight to generate efficient outcomes.

Keywords: franchise bidding; natural monopoly; regulation; contestable markets; quality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
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Working Paper: Contestable Licensing (2000)
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DOI: 10.2202/1538-0645.1129

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