 Moral FederalismThe B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, 2006, vol. 5, issue 1, 27 Abstract: Many political issues like abortion, gay marriage or assisted suicide are strongly contested because individuals have preferences not only over their own choice but also about other individuals' actions. The paper models and compares the equilibria of three institutional regimes (ranging from centralized to decentralized decision making) in an economy where individuals choose their residence and vote over a single-dimensional regulatory policy at the regional and national level. Moral federalism describes a phenomenon where the majority of people who favor a restrictive policy try to impose their preferences through the federal government on jurisdictions where permissive policies are favored. The majority group's gain is larger, the smaller it is in size relative to the entire population. At the normative level, the outcome under centralized and decentralized decision making is the worst when societies are polarized. Allowing the federal government to restrict regional choices is never optimal. Keywords: federalism; decentralization; Tiebout equilibrium; externality; morals (search for similar items in EconPapers) Downloads: (external link) Related works: Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bpj:bejeap:v:contributions.5:y:2006:i:1:n:32 Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from Access Statistics for this article The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy is currently edited by Hendrik Jürges and Sandra Ludwig More articles in The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy from De Gruyter |
Is your work missing from RePEc? Here is how to contribute.
Questions or problems? Check the EconPapers FAQ or send mail to .
EconPapers is hosted by the
School of Business at Örebro University.