Ambient environmental inspections and commitment towards enforcement policies: substitutes or complements?
Laurent Franckx ()
The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, 2002, vol. 2, issue 1, 1-20
We consider an inspection game between polluting firms and an environmental enforcement agency that can inspect ambient pollution before inspecting individual firms. We assume that the enforcement agency's objectives do not perfectly correspond with the objectives of the legislative body who determines the standards for compliance and the fines for non-compliance, and that the enforcement agency can determine its inspection policy independently. However, contrary to Franckx (2002), we assume that the agency can commit to inspection probabilities. We show that this commitment power radically changes the value of ambient inspections.
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
https://www.degruyter.com/view/j/bejeap.2002.2.iss ... .1026.xml?format=INT (text/html)
For access to full text, subscription to the journal or payment for the individual article is required.
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bpj:bejeap:v:topics.2:y:2002:i:1:n:1
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
Access Statistics for this article
The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy is currently edited by Hendrik Jürges and Sandra Ludwig
More articles in The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy from De Gruyter
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Peter Golla ().