Preventive Health Care and Payment Systems

Pedro Barros and Xavier Martinez-Giralt

The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, 2003, vol. 3, issue 1, 1-23

Abstract: Prevention has been a main issue of recent policy orientations in health care. This renews the interest on how different organizational designs and the definition of payment schemes to providers may affect the incentives to provide preventive health care.

Date: 2003
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DOI: 10.2202/1538-0653.1115

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