Legal Hold-up in Cotenancy
Manel Baucells () and
Lippman Steven A. ()
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Lippman Steven A.: University of California, Los Angeles
The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, 2003, vol. 3, issue 1, 1-33
Our analysis (Baucells and Lippman ) of the problem of legal hold-up in co-ownership, in which legal partition is the only remedy to force a sale, proceeded as if a sale of the asset could be effected at any time at a fixed price if the cotenants agree. Here we utilize the more realistic assumption that potential buyers appear intermittently (in accord with a Poisson process and that the price offered is drawn from a specified distribution).
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