Tax Competition and Tax Harmonization With Evasion

Nestor Gandelman and Ruben Hernandez-Murillo

The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, 2004, vol. 4, issue 1, 1-24

Abstract: We examine a two-jurisdiction tax competition environment where local governments can only imperfectly monitor where agents pay taxes and risk-averse individuals may choose to cross borders to pay lower taxes in a neighboring location.

Date: 2004
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Working Paper: Tax competition and tax harmonization with evasion (2002)
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DOI: 10.2202/1538-0653.1219

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