Commitment and Discretion in Health Care Policy Making

Robert Rosenman and Friesner Daniel ()
Additional contact information
Friesner Daniel: Gonzaga University

The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, 2004, vol. 4, issue 1, 1-30

Abstract: This paper analyzes the welfare effect from government sponsored insurance under two policy regimes for reimbursement levels – the first under which policy makers commit to a specific reimbursement schedule, the second which allows discretion in setting reimbursement schedules. We find that prices and quality will differ depending on which policy regimen is followed. We are able to identify a level for the policy maker’s elasticity of utility with respect to its policy tool under which government insured patients are unambiguously better off with policy commitment. The ordering of welfare is reversed if the elasticity of utility is reversed. In either case, privately insured patients may be better or worse off.

Date: 2004
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.2202/1538-0653.1167 (text/html)
For access to full text, subscription to the journal or payment for the individual article is required.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bpj:bejeap:v:topics.4:y:2004:i:1:n:5

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.degruyter.com/journal/key/bejeap/html

DOI: 10.2202/1538-0653.1167

Access Statistics for this article

The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy is currently edited by Hendrik Jürges and Sandra Ludwig

More articles in The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy from De Gruyter
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Peter Golla ().