Quality and Consumer Choice in Healthcare: Evidence from Kidney Transplantation
Howard David H
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Howard David H: Emory University, dhhowar@emory.edu
The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, 2006, vol. 5, issue 1, 22
Abstract:
Most studies of competition in health care focus on prices and costs, but concerns about quality play a central role in policy debates. If demand is inelastic to quality, then competition may reduce patient welfare. This study uses a dataset of patient registrations for kidney transplantation in conjunction with a mixed logit model to gauge consumers’ responsiveness to quality when choosing hospitals. Results indicate that at the hospital level, a one-standard deviation increase in the graft-failure rate is associated with a 6% decline in patient registrations. Privately-insured patients are more responsive to quality than Medicare patients, suggesting that insurers consider quality when contracting with providers.
Keywords: hospitals; consumer choice; quality; health; medicine (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bpj:bejeap:v:topics.5:y:2006:i:1:n:24
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DOI: 10.1515/1538-0653.1349
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