Variable Search Intensity with Coordination Unemployment

Leo Kaas

The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, 2010, vol. 10, issue 1, 33

Abstract: This paper analyzes an urn-ball matching model in which workers decide how intensively they sample job openings and apply at a stochastic number of suitable vacancies. The model allows for tractable equilibrium characterization with a continuous search intensity margin. Equilibrium is not constrained efficient; entry is excessive, search intensity can be too high or too low, and an inefficient discouraged-worker effect among homogenous workers emerges under adverse labor market conditions. Unlike existing coordination-friction economies with fixed search intensity, the model can account for the empirical relation between the job-finding rate and the vacancy-unemployment ratio, provided that search costs are small and that search intensity is sufficiently procyclical.

Keywords: matching function; coordination frictions; unemployment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (17)

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DOI: 10.2202/1935-1690.2162

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