Population dynamics and marriage payments: an analysis of the long run equilibrium in India

Sudeshna Maitra

The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, 2018, vol. 18, issue 2, 26

Abstract: Why do scarce Indian women pay dowry to secure grooms even as the sex-ratio of offspring is manipulated by parents? We develop a dynamic general equilibrium model of demographic and marriage market outcomes with endogenous gender preference. We find, that under a calibration of parameters suggested by Indian marriage market indicators, any long run steady state equilibrium must have both dowry and a masculine sex ratio. The key assumption that generates this result is the asymmetric marital preferences of men and women regarding own and spouse’s ideal age at marriage.

Keywords: dowry; dynamic general equilibrium model; marriage squeeze; steady state (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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DOI: 10.1515/bejm-2017-0191

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