The Arrow Effect under Competitive R&D

Guido Cozzi

The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, 2007, vol. 7, issue 1, 20

Abstract: This paper shows that standard Schumpeterian theory does not imply that the incumbent monopolist has too little incentive to carry out R&D aimed at displacing its own product. If the patent holder is rational as is any other R&D investor, she will know that in equilibrium her patent's obsolescence shall not be affected by her own R&D investment, because all the R&D firms operate under perfect competition and constant returns to scale at the private level. This reconciles Schumpeterian theory with the empirical evidence on innovation by incumbents. It is proved that the usual macroeconomic implications maintain their validity.

Keywords: Arrow effect; basic Schumpeterian model; R&D and growth; innovation by incumbents (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (64)

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DOI: 10.2202/1935-1690.1215

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