Evaluating Communication Strategies for Public Agencies: Transparency, Opacity, and Secrecy

Axel Lindner

The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, 2009, vol. 9, issue 1, 18

Abstract: This paper analyses in a simple global games framework welfare effects stemming from different communication strategies of public agencies if strategies of agents are complementary to each other: communication can either be fully transparent, or the agency opaquely publishes only its overall assessment of the economy, or it keeps information completely secret. It is shown that private agents put more weight on their private information in the transparent case than in the case of opacity. Thus, in many cases, the appropriate measure against overreliance on public information is giving more details to the public instead of denying access to public information.

Keywords: transparency; private information; common knowledge (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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DOI: 10.2202/1935-1690.1801

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