Characterizing Welfare-egalitarian Mechanisms with Solidarity When Valuations are Private Information

Duygu Yengin ()

The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 2012, vol. 12, issue 1, 35

Abstract: In the problem of assigning indivisible goods and monetary transfers, we characterize welfare-egalitarian mechanisms (that are decision-efficient and incentive compatible) with an axiom of solidarity under preference changes and a fair ranking axiom of order preservation. This result is in line with characterizations of egalitarian rules with solidarity in other economic models. We also show that we can replace order-preservation with egalitarian-equivalence or no-envy (on the subadditive domain) and still characterize the welfare-egalitarian class. However, if we weaken order preservation to symmetry, mechanisms that are not welfare-egalitarian exist. We also study upper bounds on deficit and welfare lower bounds that characterize subclasses of the welfare-egalitarian class.

Keywords: welfare egalitarianism; solidarity; order preservation; egalitarian-equivalence; noenvy; distributive justice; NIMBY problems; imposition of tasks; allocation of indivisible (public) goods and money; the Groves mechanisms; strategy-proofness; unanimity; symmetry; fair allocation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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Working Paper: Characterizing Welfare-egalitarian Mechanisms with Solidarity When Valuations are Private Information (2011)
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DOI: 10.1515/1935-1704.1789

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