Characterizing Welfare-egalitarian Mechanisms with Solidarity When Valuations are Private Information

Duygu Yengin ()

No 2011-20, School of Economics and Public Policy Working Papers from University of Adelaide, School of Economics and Public Policy

Abstract: In the problem of assigning indivisible goods and monetary transfers, we characterize welfare-egalitarian mechanisms (that are decision-efficient and incentive compatible) with an axiom of solidarity under preference changes and a fair ranking axiom of order preservation. This result is in line with characterizations of egalitarian rules with solidarity in other economic models. We also show that we can replace order-preservation with egalitarian-equivalence or no-envy (on the subadditive domain) and still characterize the welfare-egalitarian class. We show that, in the model we consider, the welfare-egalitarian mechanisms appear to be the best candidates to satisfy several different fairness and solidarity requirements as well as generating bounded deficits.

Keywords: egalitarianism; solidarity; order preservation; egalitarian-equivalence; no-envy; distributive justice; NIMBY problems; imposition of tasks; allocation of indivisible (public) goods and money; the Groves mechanisms; strategy-proofness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C79 D61 D63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 24 pages
Date: 2011-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta and nep-gth
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Journal Article: Characterizing Welfare-egalitarian Mechanisms with Solidarity When Valuations are Private Information (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:adl:wpaper:2011-20

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