On Partially Honest Nash Implementation in Private Good Economies with Restricted Domains: A Sufficient Condition

Ahmed Doghmi () and Abderrahmane Ziad

The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 2013, vol. 13, issue 1, 415-428

Abstract: In this article, we study the problem of Nash implementation in private good economies with single-peaked, single-plateaued, and single-dipped preferences in the presence of at least one minimally honest agent. We prove that all solutions of the problem of fair division satisfying unanimity can be implemented in Nash equilibria as long as there are at least three agents participating in the mechanism (game form). To justify this result, we provide a list of solutions which violate the condition of no-veto power.

Keywords: Nash implementation; partial honesty; single-peaked preferences; single-plateaued preferences; single-dipped preferences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (15)

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DOI: 10.1515/bejte-2012-0028

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