Details about Ahmed Doghmi
Access statistics for papers by Ahmed Doghmi.
Last updated 2017-02-18. Update your information in the RePEc Author Service.
Short-id: pdo435
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Working Papers
2016
- Multi-winner scoring election methods: Condorcet consistency and paradoxes
Working Papers, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon View citations (30)
Also in Working Papers, HAL (2016) View citations (30) Post-Print, HAL (2016) View citations (29)
See also Journal Article Multi-winner scoring election methods: Condorcet consistency and paradoxes, Public Choice, Springer (2016) View citations (31) (2016)
- Strategy proofness and unanimity in many-to-one matching markets
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany View citations (1)
- Strategy proofness and unanimity in private good economies with single-peaked preferences
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany View citations (2)
Also in Working Papers, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon (2015) View citations (1) Working Papers, HAL (2015) View citations (1)
2015
- A Simple Necessary Condition for Partially Honest Nash Implementation
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany View citations (4)
- Nash implementation in private good economies with single-plateaued preferences and in matching problems
Post-Print, HAL View citations (6)
See also Journal Article Nash implementation in private good economies with single-plateaued preferences and in matching problems, Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier (2015) View citations (5) (2015)
2013
- Nash Implementation in Private Good Economies with Single-Plateaued Preferences
Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes & University of Caen), Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes, University of Caen and CNRS View citations (7)
- On Partially Honest Nash Implementation in Private Good Economies with Restricted Domains: A Sufficient Condition
Post-Print, HAL View citations (15)
See also Journal Article On Partially Honest Nash Implementation in Private Good Economies with Restricted Domains: A Sufficient Condition, The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter (2013) View citations (15) (2013)
2012
- On Partial Honesty Nash Implementation
Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes & University of Caen), Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes, University of Caen and CNRS View citations (3)
2009
- Faulty Nash Implementation in Exchange Economies with Single-peaked Preferences
Jena Economics Research Papers, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena
- On reciprocal Behavior in Prisoner Dilemma game
Jena Economics Research Papers, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena
2008
- Nash implementation in exchange economies with single-peaked preferences
Post-Print, HAL View citations (11)
See also Journal Article Nash implementation in exchange economies with single-peaked preferences, Economics Letters, Elsevier (2008) View citations (11) (2008)
- Reexamination of Maskin's Theorem on Nash implementability
Post-Print, HAL View citations (6)
See also Journal Article Reexamination of Maskin's Theorem on Nash implementability, Economics Letters, Elsevier (2008) View citations (9) (2008)
- Sur la théorie de l'implémentation et ses applications économiques
Post-Print, HAL
2007
- Fault Tolerant Bayesian Implementation in Exchange Economies
MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany
Journal Articles
2016
- Multi-winner scoring election methods: Condorcet consistency and paradoxes
Public Choice, 2016, 169, (1), 97-116 View citations (31)
See also Working Paper Multi-winner scoring election methods: Condorcet consistency and paradoxes, Working Papers (2016) View citations (30) (2016)
- On Nash Implementability in Allotment Economies under Domain Restrictions with Indifference
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 2016, 16, (2), 767-795 View citations (2)
2015
- Nash implementation in private good economies with single-plateaued preferences and in matching problems
Mathematical Social Sciences, 2015, 73, (C), 32-39 View citations (5)
See also Working Paper Nash implementation in private good economies with single-plateaued preferences and in matching problems, Post-Print (2015) View citations (6) (2015)
2014
- Nash Implementation in Rationing Problems with Single-Crossing Preferences
Mathematical Economics Letters, 2014, 1, (2-4), 69-74
2013
- Nash Implementation in Private Good Economies when Preferences are Single-Dipped with Best Indifferent Allocations
Mathematical Economics Letters, 2013, 1, (1), 35-42 View citations (5)
- Nash Implementation in an Allocation Problem with Single-Dipped Preferences
Games, 2013, 4, (1), 1-12 View citations (10)
- On Partially Honest Nash Implementation in Private Good Economies with Restricted Domains: A Sufficient Condition
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 2013, 13, (1), 415-428 View citations (15)
See also Working Paper On Partially Honest Nash Implementation in Private Good Economies with Restricted Domains: A Sufficient Condition, Post-Print (2013) View citations (15) (2013)
2008
- Nash implementation in exchange economies with single-peaked preferences
Economics Letters, 2008, 100, (1), 157-160 View citations (11)
See also Working Paper Nash implementation in exchange economies with single-peaked preferences, Post-Print (2008) View citations (11) (2008)
- Reexamination of Maskin's Theorem on Nash implementability
Economics Letters, 2008, 100, (1), 150-152 View citations (9)
See also Working Paper Reexamination of Maskin's Theorem on Nash implementability, Post-Print (2008) View citations (6) (2008)
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