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Details about Ahmed Doghmi

E-mail:
Homepage:https://sites.google.com/site/websiteofahmeddoghmi/
Phone:00 212 6 63 81 33 42
Postal address:National Institute of Statistics and Applied Economics, PO Box 6217, Office 17, Rabat-Institutes, 10100, Rabat, Morocco.
Workplace:جامعة محمد الخامس بالرباط, المدرسة المحمدية للمهندسين, المعهد الوطني للإحصاء والاقتصادالتطبيقي

Access statistics for papers by Ahmed Doghmi.

Last updated 2017-02-18. Update your information in the RePEc Author Service.

Short-id: pdo435


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Working Papers

2016

  1. Multi-winner scoring election methods: Condorcet consistency and paradoxes
    Post-Print, HAL View citations (29)
    Also in Working Papers, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon (2016) Downloads View citations (30)
    Working Papers, HAL (2016) Downloads View citations (30)

    See also Journal Article Multi-winner scoring election methods: Condorcet consistency and paradoxes, Public Choice, Springer (2016) Downloads View citations (31) (2016)
  2. Strategy proofness and unanimity in many-to-one matching markets
    MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany Downloads View citations (1)
  3. Strategy proofness and unanimity in private good economies with single-peaked preferences
    MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany Downloads View citations (2)
    Also in Working Papers, HAL (2015) Downloads View citations (1)
    Working Papers, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon (2015) Downloads View citations (1)

2015

  1. A Simple Necessary Condition for Partially Honest Nash Implementation
    MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany Downloads View citations (4)
  2. Nash implementation in private good economies with single-plateaued preferences and in matching problems
    Post-Print, HAL View citations (6)
    See also Journal Article Nash implementation in private good economies with single-plateaued preferences and in matching problems, Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier (2015) Downloads View citations (5) (2015)

2013

  1. Nash Implementation in Private Good Economies with Single-Plateaued Preferences
    Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes & University of Caen), Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes, University of Caen and CNRS Downloads View citations (7)
  2. On Partially Honest Nash Implementation in Private Good Economies with Restricted Domains: A Sufficient Condition
    Post-Print, HAL View citations (15)
    See also Journal Article On Partially Honest Nash Implementation in Private Good Economies with Restricted Domains: A Sufficient Condition, The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter (2013) Downloads View citations (15) (2013)

2012

  1. On Partial Honesty Nash Implementation
    Economics Working Paper Archive (University of Rennes & University of Caen), Center for Research in Economics and Management (CREM), University of Rennes, University of Caen and CNRS Downloads View citations (3)

2009

  1. Faulty Nash Implementation in Exchange Economies with Single-peaked Preferences
    Jena Economics Research Papers, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena Downloads
  2. On reciprocal Behavior in Prisoner Dilemma game
    Jena Economics Research Papers, Friedrich-Schiller-University Jena Downloads

2008

  1. Nash implementation in exchange economies with single-peaked preferences
    Post-Print, HAL View citations (11)
    See also Journal Article Nash implementation in exchange economies with single-peaked preferences, Economics Letters, Elsevier (2008) Downloads View citations (11) (2008)
  2. Reexamination of Maskin's Theorem on Nash implementability
    Post-Print, HAL View citations (6)
    See also Journal Article Reexamination of Maskin's Theorem on Nash implementability, Economics Letters, Elsevier (2008) Downloads View citations (9) (2008)
  3. Sur la théorie de l'implémentation et ses applications économiques
    Post-Print, HAL

2007

  1. Fault Tolerant Bayesian Implementation in Exchange Economies
    MPRA Paper, University Library of Munich, Germany Downloads

Journal Articles

2016

  1. Multi-winner scoring election methods: Condorcet consistency and paradoxes
    Public Choice, 2016, 169, (1), 97-116 Downloads View citations (31)
    See also Working Paper Multi-winner scoring election methods: Condorcet consistency and paradoxes, Post-Print (2016) View citations (29) (2016)
  2. On Nash Implementability in Allotment Economies under Domain Restrictions with Indifference
    The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 2016, 16, (2), 767-795 Downloads View citations (2)

2015

  1. Nash implementation in private good economies with single-plateaued preferences and in matching problems
    Mathematical Social Sciences, 2015, 73, (C), 32-39 Downloads View citations (5)
    See also Working Paper Nash implementation in private good economies with single-plateaued preferences and in matching problems, Post-Print (2015) View citations (6) (2015)

2014

  1. Nash Implementation in Rationing Problems with Single-Crossing Preferences
    Mathematical Economics Letters, 2014, 1, (2-4), 69-74 Downloads

2013

  1. Nash Implementation in Private Good Economies when Preferences are Single-Dipped with Best Indifferent Allocations
    Mathematical Economics Letters, 2013, 1, (1), 35-42 Downloads View citations (5)
  2. Nash Implementation in an Allocation Problem with Single-Dipped Preferences
    Games, 2013, 4, (1), 1-12 Downloads View citations (10)
  3. On Partially Honest Nash Implementation in Private Good Economies with Restricted Domains: A Sufficient Condition
    The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 2013, 13, (1), 415-428 Downloads View citations (15)
    See also Working Paper On Partially Honest Nash Implementation in Private Good Economies with Restricted Domains: A Sufficient Condition, Post-Print (2013) View citations (15) (2013)

2008

  1. Nash implementation in exchange economies with single-peaked preferences
    Economics Letters, 2008, 100, (1), 157-160 Downloads View citations (11)
    See also Working Paper Nash implementation in exchange economies with single-peaked preferences, Post-Print (2008) View citations (11) (2008)
  2. Reexamination of Maskin's Theorem on Nash implementability
    Economics Letters, 2008, 100, (1), 150-152 Downloads View citations (9)
    See also Working Paper Reexamination of Maskin's Theorem on Nash implementability, Post-Print (2008) View citations (6) (2008)
 
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