Reexamination of Maskin's Theorem on Nash implementability

Ahmed Doghmi () and Abderrahmane Ziad

Economics Letters, 2008, vol. 100, issue 1, 150-152

Abstract: We reexamine Maskin's Theorem by proposing slight modifications on Maskin's conditions of monotonicity and no veto power. We show that any social choice correspondence (SCC) that satisfies strict monotonicity, strict no veto power and unanimity can be implemented in Nash equilibria.

Date: 2008
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Working Paper: Reexamination of Maskin's Theorem on Nash implementability (2008)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:100:y:2008:i:1:p:150-152

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