Nash Implementation in Private Good Economies when Preferences are Single-Dipped with Best Indifferent Allocations

Ahmed Doghmi ()

Mathematical Economics Letters, 2013, vol. 1, issue 1, 35-42

Abstract: In this paper we study the problem of the Nash implementation in private good economies when preferences are single-dipped by allowing multiple best indifferent elements. We give a full characterization in this domain by showing that a social choice correspondence (SCC) is Nash implementable if and only if satisfies Maskin monotonicity. To support this result, we give examples of some well-known SCCs that satisfying or not satisfying Maskin's proprieties.

Keywords: Nash implementation; private good economies; single-dipped domain with indifferences; Nash implementation; private good economies; single-dipped domain with indifferences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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DOI: 10.1515/mel-2013-0003

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