Strategy proofness and unanimity in private good economies with single-peaked preferences

Mostapha Diss (), Ahmed Doghmi () and Abdelmonaim Tlidi ()
Additional contact information
Mostapha Diss: Université de Lyon, Lyon, F-69007, France ; CNRS, GATE Lyon St Etienne,F-69130 Ecully, France, Université Jean Monnet, Saint-Etienne, F-42000, France
Abdelmonaim Tlidi: University of Marrakech, National School of Applied Science - Safi, Route Sidi Bouzid B.P. 63, 46000 Safi, Morocco

No 1528, Working Papers from Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique Lyon St-Étienne (GATE Lyon St-Étienne), Université de Lyon

Abstract: In this paper we examine the relation between strategy-proofness and unanimity in a domain of private good economies with single-peaked preferences. We prove that, under a mild condition, a social choice function satisfies strategy-proofness if and only if it is unanimous. As implication, we show that when the property of citizen sovereignty holds, strategy proofness and Maskin monotonicity become equivalent. We also give applications to implementation literature: We provide a full characterization for dominant strategy implementation, standard Nash implementation, and partially honest Nash implementation and we prove that these theories are equivalent.

Keywords: Strategy-proofness; Unanimity; Maskin monotonicity; Private good economies; Single-peaked preferences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Strategy proofness and unanimity in private good economies with single-peaked preferences (2016)
Working Paper: Strategy proofness and unanimity in private good economies with single-peaked preferences (2015)
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