Strategy proofness and unanimity in private good economies with single-peaked preferences
Ahmed Doghmi () and
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Mostapha Diss: GATE Lyon Saint-Étienne - Groupe d'analyse et de théorie économique - ENS Lyon - École normale supérieure - Lyon - UL2 - Université Lumière - Lyon 2 - UCBL - Université Claude Bernard Lyon 1 - Université de Lyon - UJM - Université Jean Monnet [Saint-Étienne] - Université de Lyon - CNRS - Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique
Abdelmonaim Tlidi: ENSA Marrakech - École nationale des sciences appliquées de Marrakech
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In this paper we establish the link between strategy-proofness and unanimity in a domain of private good economies with single-peaked preferences. We introduce a new condition and we prove that if this new property together with the requirement of citizen sovereignty are held, a social choice function satisfies strategy-proofness if and only if it is unanimous. As an implication, we show that strategy-proofness and Maskin monotonicity become equivalent. We also give applications to implementation literature: We provide a full characterization for standard Nash implementation and partially honest Nash implementation and we determine a certain equivalence among these theories.
Keywords: Single-peaked preferences; Maskin monotonicity; Private good economies; Strategy-proofness; Unanimity (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
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Working Paper: Strategy proofness and unanimity in private good economies with single-peaked preferences (2016)
Working Paper: Strategy proofness and unanimity in private good economies with single-peaked preferences (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:wpaper:halshs-01226803
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