Strategy proofness and unanimity in private good economies with single-peaked preferences

Mostapha Diss, Ahmed Doghmi () and Abdelmonaim Tlidi

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: In this paper we establish the link between strategy-proofness and unanimity in a domain of private good economies with single-peaked preferences. We introduce a new condition and we prove that if this new property together with the requirement of citizen sovereignty are held, a social choice function satisfies strategy-proofness if and only if it is unanimous. As an implication, we show that strategy-proofness and Maskin monotonicity become equivalent. We also give applications to implementation literature: We provide a full characterization for standard Nash implementation and partially honest Nash implementation and we determine a certain equivalence among these theories.

Keywords: Strategy-proofness; Unanimity; Maskin monotonicity, Private goods economies; Single-peaked preferences. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 C72 D7 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-11-06, Revised 2016-12-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Strategy proofness and unanimity in private good economies with single-peaked preferences (2015)
Working Paper: Strategy proofness and unanimity in private good economies with single-peaked preferences (2015)
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