Strategy proofness and unanimity in many-to-one matching markets

Mostapha Diss, Ahmed Doghmi () and Abdelmonaim Tlidi

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: In this paper, we consider a standard model of many-to-one matching markets. First, we study the relation between strategy-proofness and unanimity under a certain requirement and we prove these two properties become equivalent. Second, we illustrate that this result has an immediate impact on the relation between strategy-proofness and Maskin monotonicity. Finally, we determine a close connexion between strategy-proofness and implementation literature. We provide under certain minimal requirements the foundation for reasoning the equivalence among dominant strategy implementation, standard Nash implementation, and partially honest Nash implementation.

Keywords: Many-to-one matching markets; strategy-proofness; unanimity; Maskin monotonicity, implementation. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C78 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-12-08, Revised 2016-12-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/75927/1/MPRA_paper_75927.pdf original version (application/pdf)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/76985/8/MPRA_paper_76985.pdf revised version (application/pdf)
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/76231/1/MPRA_paper_76231.pdf revised version (application/pdf)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:pra:mprapa:75927

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