Nash implementation in private good economies with single-plateaued preferences and in matching problems

Ahmed Doghmi () and Abderrahmane Ziad

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Abstract: In this paper we explore the problem of Nash implementation providing two new properties called I-monotonicity and I-weak no-veto power. These properties form together with unanimity a new sufficient condition for a social choice correspondence to be implementable in Nash equilibria with at least three agents. As applications, we prove that: (1) In private good economies with single-plateaued preferences, each solution of the problem of fair division that has a full range is Nash implementable if and only if it satisfies Maskin monotonicity, (2) In matching problems, Maskin monotonicity is a necessary and sufficient condition for implementation.

Keywords: Nash implementation; private good economies with single-plateaued preferences; matching problems (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Published in Mathematical Social Sciences, 2015, 73, pp.32-39. ⟨10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2014.11.002⟩

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Journal Article: Nash implementation in private good economies with single-plateaued preferences and in matching problems (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:hal:journl:halshs-01116843

DOI: 10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2014.11.002

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