Family Ties and Corruption
Anastasia Litina () and
Varvarigos Dimitrios ()
Additional contact information
Varvarigos Dimitrios: School of Business, Department of Economics, University of Leicester, Mallard House (Brookfield campus), 266 London Road, Leicester, LE2 1RQ, UK
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 2023, vol. 23, issue 1, 195-222
Abstract:
We study the relation between nuclear family ties and corruption. Our theoretical model shows that the population share of people who desire close ties with their families (i.e. the extensive margin) has an ambiguous effect on the level of corruption, due to the presence of conflicting mechanisms. However, the strength of this desire among people who want close family ties (i.e. the intensive margin) has an unambiguously negative effect on corruption. The latter outcome finds support from our empirical analysis: Using micro-level data, we show that, in contrast to conventional wisdom and cross-country reflections, stronger family ties are negatively correlated with a broad set of activities that measure corruption.
Keywords: corruption; corruption attitudes; family ties (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D73 Z10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2023
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)
Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1515/bejte-2021-0025 (text/html)
For access to full text, subscription to the journal or payment for the individual article is required.
Related works:
Working Paper: Family Ties and Corruption (2018) 
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:23:y:2023:i:1:p:195-222:n:1
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.degruyter.com/journal/key/bejte/html
DOI: 10.1515/bejte-2021-0025
Access Statistics for this article
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics is currently edited by Burkhard C. Schipper
More articles in The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics from De Gruyter
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Peter Golla ().