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Family Ties and Corruption

Anastasia Litina () and Dimitrios Varvarigos

MPRA Paper from University Library of Munich, Germany

Abstract: We construct a model to examine the relation between family ties and corruption. The overall effect of strong family ties on the incentive to be corrupt can be ambiguous due to the presence of conflicting mechanisms. The model also shows that the measure of family ties can be crucial in determining its observed effect on corruption, thus offering a theoretical foundation on why the empirical outcomes entailing cross-country comparisons can differ from the outcomes of micro-level empirical investigations. This aspect of the theoretical framework is verified by our empirical analysis: Using micro-level data, we show that, in contrast to conventional wisdom and cross-country comparisons, stronger family ties reduce the approval for a broad set of activities that measure corruption.

Keywords: Corruption; Family values (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D73 Z10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-09-13
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gro and nep-soc
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https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/98597/1/MPRA_paper_98597.pdf revised version (application/pdf)

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