Tax Differentials and the Segmentation of Networks of Cooperation in Oligopoly
Hassan Benchekroun () and
Denis Claude ()
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 2007, vol. 7, issue 1, 1-11
This paper studies the effects of uncoordinated environmental tax policies on firms' incentives to form bilateral R&D collaborations. It is shown that the complete network is pair-wise stable for small differences in the taxation of environmental emissions. Larger tax differentials may induce firms to abandon all their international collaborations.
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Working Paper: Tax Differentials and the Segmentation of Networks of Cooperation in Oligopoly (2006)
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