Tax Differentials and the Segmentation of Networks of Cooperation in Oligopoly
Hassan Benchekroun () and
Denis Claude ()
Cahiers de recherche from Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ
This paper studies the effects of uncoordinated environmental tax policies on firms’ incentives to form bilateral R&D collaborations. It is shown that the complete network is pair-wise stable for small differences in the taxation of environmental emissions. Larger tax differentials may induce firms to break all their international collaborations.
Keywords: Uncoordinated environmental actions; Taxation; Networks; R&D (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: Q55 L13 L20 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Journal Article: Tax Differentials and the Segmentation of Networks of Cooperation in Oligopoly (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mtl:montec:19-2006
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