Tax Differentials and the Segmentation of Networks of Cooperation in Oligopoly

Hassan Benchekroun and Denis Claude ()

Cahiers de recherche from Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ

Abstract: This paper studies the effects of uncoordinated environmental tax policies on firms’ incentives to form bilateral R&D collaborations. It is shown that the complete network is pair-wise stable for small differences in the taxation of environmental emissions. Larger tax differentials may induce firms to break all their international collaborations.

Keywords: Uncoordinated environmental actions; Taxation; Networks; R&D (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L13 L20 Q55 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 13 pages
Date: 2006
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Journal Article: Tax Differentials and the Segmentation of Networks of Cooperation in Oligopoly (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mtl:montec:19-2006

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