Contests with Ties

Cohen Chen and Aner Sela
Additional contact information
Cohen Chen: Ben-Gurion University, chencohe@bgu.ac.il

The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 2007, vol. 7, issue 1, 18

Abstract: We study two-player all-pay contests in which there is a positive probability of a tied outcome. We show that the players' efforts in equilibrium do not depend on the expected prize in the case of a tie given that this prize is smaller than the prize for winning. The implications of this result are twofold. First, in symmetric one-stage contests, the designer who wishes to maximize the expected total effort should not award a prize in the case of a tie which is larger than one-third of the prize for winning. Second, in multi-stage contests, the designer should not limit the number of stages (tie-breaks) but should allow the contest to continue until a winner is decided.

Keywords: contests; all-pay auctions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2007
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (25)

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Related works:
Working Paper: CONTESTS WITH TIES (2005)
Working Paper: Contests with Ties (2005)
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DOI: 10.2202/1935-1704.1398

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