CONTESTS WITH TIES

Chen Cohen and Aner Sela
Additional contact information
Chen Cohen: BGU

No 511, Working Papers from Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Department of Economics

Abstract: We study all-pay contests in which there is a positive probability of a tied outcome. We analyze both one-stage contests and multi-stage contests with tie- breaks. We demonstrate that in symmetric two-player contests, the designer does not have an incentive to award a prize in a case of a tie. Consequently, in symmetric multi-stage two-player contests, the designer should allow an un- limited number of tie-breaks until a winner is decided.

Keywords: Contests; All-Pay Auctions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 23 pages
Date: 2005
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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https://in.bgu.ac.il/en/humsos/Econ/Workingpapers/0511.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Contests with Ties (2007)
Working Paper: Contests with Ties (2005)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bgu:wpaper:0511

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