Sequential Decision-Making and Asymmetric Equilibria: An Application to Takeovers
David Gill () and
The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 2004, vol. 4, issue 1, 1-10
With indivisible shareholdings and simultaneous shareholder decision-making, the existing takeover literature provides a reasonable profit only in asymmetric equilibria. We allow the raider to approach shareholders sequentially and thereby find a unique equilibrium that produces the same outcome.
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