Endogenous Favoritism in Organizations

Illoong Kwon ()

The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, 2006, vol. 6, issue 1, 26

Abstract: This paper shows that favoritism can arise endogenously as an optimal decision rule in a symmetric model with an ex-ante impartial principal. Furthermore, favoritism dominates fairness specifically when the favorite promotes his own idea and ignores the other's idea so that the non-favorite loses motivation. Our model also provides new insights on hierarchical communication structure and group authority.

Keywords: favoritism; fairness; communication; delegation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
References: View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.2202/1534-598X.1273 (text/html)
For access to full text, subscription to the journal or payment for the individual article is required.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bpj:bejtec:v:topics.6:y:2006:i:1:n:10

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.degruyter.com/journal/key/bejte/html

DOI: 10.2202/1534-598X.1273

Access Statistics for this article

The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics is currently edited by Burkhard C. Schipper

More articles in The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics from De Gruyter
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Peter Golla ().