Loss-Leaders Banning Laws as Vertical Restraints

Marie-Laure Allain and Claire Chambolle ()

Journal of Agricultural & Food Industrial Organization, 2005, vol. 3, issue 1, 25

Abstract: This paper explores the indirect inflationary mechanism allowed by loss-leaders banning laws. In a model where a monopolist producer sells his product through vertically separated and differentiated retailers, we show that the ban of loss-leading can be used strategically by the producer to increase his wholesale price and pay the retailers through negotiated listing fees, thus raising his profit. The ban turns wholesale prices into floor prices, thus increasing resale price and lessening consumers' welfare. These results are robust if the listing fees are two-part tariff.

Keywords: vertical restraints; loss-leaders; retailing sector; intrabrand competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2005
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Loss leaders banning laws as vertical restraints (2007)
Working Paper: Loss-leaders Banning Laws as Vertical Restraints (2004)
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DOI: 10.2202/1542-0485.1092

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