Can Risk Averse Competitive Input Providers Serve Farmers Efficiently?

Paul Makdissi () and Quentin Wodon

Journal of Agricultural & Food Industrial Organization, 2009, vol. 7, issue 1, 12

Abstract: Under price ceilings and quality floors for agricultural inputs in cash crop sectors in developing countries where credit markets are weak, imperfect information on the ability of farmers to pay for their inputs at the end of the cropping season may lead the decentralized production of those inputs by risk averse private input providers to be inefficient. A coordinating agency and/or subsidies for new farmers could help to produce and distribute more agricultural inputs, thereby increasing the profits for input providers while also enabling more farmers to produce the crops that are key to their livelihood.

Keywords: farm inputs; risk aversion; price control; public good (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.2202/1542-0485.1229 (text/html)
For access to full text, subscription to the journal or payment for the individual article is required.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bpj:bjafio:v:7:y:2009:i:1:n:4

Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.degruyter.com/journal/key/jafio/html

DOI: 10.2202/1542-0485.1229

Access Statistics for this article

Journal of Agricultural & Food Industrial Organization is currently edited by Azzeddine Azzam

More articles in Journal of Agricultural & Food Industrial Organization from De Gruyter
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Peter Golla ().