Quid Pro Quo! Organization Theoretical Remarks about FIFA’s Legitimacy Under Blatter and Infantino

Richau Lukas (), Emrich Eike and Follert Florian
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Richau Lukas: Saarland University, Faculty of Human and Business Sciences (HW), Homburg, Saarland, Germany
Emrich Eike: Saarland University, Faculty of Human and Business Sciences (HW), Homburg, Saarland, Germany
Follert Florian: Saarland University, Faculty of Human and Business Sciences (HW), Homburg, Saarland, Germany

The Economists' Voice, 2019, vol. 16, issue 1, 9

Abstract: This article addresses the question of the legitimacy of sports organizations, with a particular focus on the football organization FIFA. By applying elements of the public choice theory as well as the concept of political machines to FIFA, we show that the FIFA leadership established an allocation system that works on a discretionary basis in addition to the formal rule-based allocation process. FIFA uses this exchange system to please selected member associations, which in return vote in favor of the leadership’s plans and secure its legitimacy. We further illustrate that such a system can only exist in the long run if the majority of both internal and external stakeholders approves the system.

Keywords: FIFA; organization theory; political machine; public choice theory; sports economics (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L20 L22 Z28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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DOI: 10.1515/ev-2019-0014

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