Collective Decision-making: FIFA from the Perspective of Public Choice

Follert Florian (), Richau Lukas, Emrich Eike and Christian Pierdzioch
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Follert Florian: Saarland University, Faculty of Empirical Human Sciences and Economics, Saarbrücken, Germany
Richau Lukas: Saarland University, Faculty of Empirical Human Sciences and Economics, Saarbrücken, Germany
Emrich Eike: Saarland University, Faculty of Empirical Human Sciences and Economics, Saarbrücken, Germany

The Economists' Voice, 2020, vol. 17, issue 1, 15

Abstract: Various scandals have shaken public confidence in football's global governing body, Fédération Internationale de Football Association (FIFA). It is evident that decision-making within such a collective provides incentives for corruption. We apply the Buchanan-Tullock model that is known from Public Choice theory to study collective decision-making within FIFA. On the basis of this theoretical model, we develop specific proposals that can contribute to combating corruption. Three core aspects are discussed: the selection of the World Cup host, transparency in the allocation of budgets, and clear guidelines for FIFA officials and bodies with regard to their rights and accountability. Our insights can contribute to a better understanding of collective decision making in heterogenous groups.

Keywords: public choice; sports economics; decision making; FIFA; corruption (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2020
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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DOI: 10.1515/ev-2019-0031

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