Could Improving Choice and Competition in Medicare Advantage be the Future of Medicare?
Alice Rivlin and
Daniel Willem
Additional contact information
Daniel Willem: Brookings Institution, Economic Studies, 1775 Massachusetts Ave, Washington DC, USA
Forum for Health Economics & Policy, 2015, vol. 18, issue 2, 151-168
Abstract:
About 30 percent of Medicare beneficiaries enroll in private Medicare Advantage (MA) plans but do so at a relatively high-cost. This paper explores the advantages and challenges of introducing competitive bidding among MA plans (Plan One) or among MA plans and Fee-for-Service (Plan Two or Premium Support). We conclude that competitive bidding could reduce the cost of Medicare, especially in densely populated urban areas. However, there would be serious challenges in rural areas and risk adjustment methodology would have to be substantially improved. In Plan Two, sicker beneficiaries might move to Fee-for-Service and beneficiaries might have to pay more to stay with a preferred provider or broader network. If these problems are addressed, we believe that premium support can be a meaningful improvement to the MA program.
Keywords: Medicare Advantage; premium support (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:
Downloads: (external link)
https://doi.org/10.1515/fhep-2015-0046 (text/html)
For access to full text, subscription to the journal or payment for the individual article is required.
Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
HTML/Text
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bpj:fhecpo:v:18:y:2015:i:2:p:151-168:n:5
Ordering information: This journal article can be ordered from
https://www.degruyter.com/journal/key/fhep/html
DOI: 10.1515/fhep-2015-0046
Access Statistics for this article
Forum for Health Economics & Policy is currently edited by Dana Goldman
More articles in Forum for Health Economics & Policy from De Gruyter
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Peter Golla ().