Fairness in the Mail and Opportunism in the Internet: A Newspaper Experiment on Ultimatum Bargaining

Güth Werner and Matthias Sutter
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Güth Werner: Max Planck Institute for Research into Economic Systems,Jena,Germany

German Economic Review, 2003, vol. 4, issue 2, 243-265

Abstract: On 11 May 2001, readers of the Berliner Zeitung were invited to participate in an ultimatum bargaining experiment played in the strategy vector mode: each participant chooses not only how much (s)he demands of the DM1,000 pie but also which of the nine possible offers of DM100, 200,y, 900 (s)he would accept or reject. In addition, participants were asked to predict the most frequent type of behavior. Three randomly selected proposer-responder pairs were rewarded according to the rules of ultimatum bargaining and three randomly chosen participants of those who predicted the most frequent type of behavior received a prize of DM500. Decisions could be submitted by mail, fax or via the internet. Behavior is described, statistically analyzed and compared to the usual laboratory ultimatum bargaining results.

Keywords: Ultimatum bargaining; newspaper (or internet) experiment; fairness; distribution conflicts (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2003
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Journal Article: Fairness in the Mail and Opportunism in the Internet: A Newspaper Experiment on Ultimatum Bargaining (2003)
Working Paper: Fairness in the mail and opportunism in the internet - a newspaper experiment on ultimatum bargaining (2003)
Working Paper: Fairness in the mail and opportunism in the internet: A newspaper experiment on ultimatum bargaining (2001)
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DOI: 10.1111/1468-0475.00081

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