Double-principal Agent: False Accounting Information, Supervision Cost and Corporate Performance

Wu Wuqing () and An Suning ()
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Wu Wuqing: School of Business, Renmin University of China, Beijing100872, China
An Suning: School of Business, Renmin University of China, Beijing100872, China

Journal of Systems Science and Information, 2014, vol. 2, issue 4, 301-312

Abstract: The game among the corporate controlling shareholder, the shareholder in power balance and the manager can lead to severe agency problems. This paper regards the shareholder in power balance as another principal and applies the latest results about double-principal agent theory in the research of manager tunneling, supervision cost and corporate performance, trying to solve the inconsistency of the above corporate governance issue researched by domestic and foreign scholars. The main conclusions are as the followings. The correlation among them depends on which one has a dominant position, the free rider effect of supervision or the positive externality effect on cash flow right. Therefore, the key to excite the positive effect of the corporate governance mechanism such as the check-and-balance of stock ownership is the degree of cooperation between shareholders.

Keywords: corporate finance; check-and-balance of stock ownership; double-principal agent theory; corporate performance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bpj:jossai:v:2:y:2014:i:4:p:301-312:n:2

DOI: 10.1515/JSSI-2014-0301

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