Sequential First-Price Auction with Randomly Arriving Buyers

Liu Shulin () and Han Xiaohu ()
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Liu Shulin: University of International Business and Economics, Beijing, 100029, China
Han Xiaohu: Hebei Academy of Governance, Shijiazhuang, 050031, China

Journal of Systems Science and Information, 2018, vol. 6, issue 1, 29-34

Abstract: In this paper we reanalyze Said’s (2011) work by retaining all his assumptions except that we use the first-price auction to sell differentiated goods to buyers in dynamic markets instead of the second-price auction. We conclude that except for the expression of the equilibrium bidding strategy, all the results for the first-price auction are exactly the same as the corresponding ones for the second-price auction established by Said (2011). This implies that the well-known “revenue equivalence theorem” holds true for Said’s (2011) dynamic model setting.

Keywords: sequential first-price auction; sequential second-price auction; dynamic market; symmetric Markov equilibrium; the difference equation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bpj:jossai:v:6:y:2018:i:1:p:29-34:n:2

DOI: 10.21078/JSSI-2018-029-06

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