Research on the Loss Sharing Contract in Supply Chain Under Asymmetric Information

Sun Jinling (), Zhu Peiyu (), Jin Shumo () and Wang Hongbin ()
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Sun Jinling: School of Economics and Management, Lanzhou University of Technology, Lanzhou, 730050, China
Zhu Peiyu: School of Economics and Management, Lanzhou University of Technology, Lanzhou, 730050, China
Jin Shumo: School of Economics and Management, Lanzhou University of Technology, Lanzhou, 730050, China
Wang Hongbin: School of Economics and Management, Lanzhou University of Technology, Lanzhou, 730050, China

Journal of Systems Science and Information, 2019, vol. 7, issue 2, 187-198

Abstract: In this study, the coordination contract of internal and external losses of supply chain under asymmetric information is studied. Firstly, the profit functions of supplier and manufacturer are established respectively. Secondly, the contract under unilateral and bilateral moral hazard is designed. Finally, a numerical example is given to analyze the coordination contract. It is proved that the overall coordination of supply chain can be achieved through loss sharing contract, and the quality level and overall profit can be improved.

Keywords: supply chain; loss sharing; asymmetric information; bilateral moral hazard; contract coordination (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:bpj:jossai:v:7:y:2019:i:2:p:187-198:n:7

DOI: 10.21078/JSSI-2019-187-12

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