A Note on Second Order Probabilities in the Traditional Deterrence Game

Carlson Lisa J () and Dacey Raymond ()
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Carlson Lisa J: University of Idaho
Dacey Raymond: University of Idaho

Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, 2010, vol. 15, issue 1, 153-162

Abstract: This note focuses on a methodological issue that arises naturally in applications of the traditional deterrence game played under two-sided incomplete information. The problem has potentially interesting implications for the status of the conclusions we draw from various applications of the traditional deterrence game.

Keywords: deterrence game; second order probabilities (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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DOI: 10.2202/1554-8597.1179

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