Opportunity Costs and the Probability of War in an Incomplete Information Game (With Comments by Lloyd Jeff Dumas)

Solomon Polachek and Jun Xiang ()

Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, 2010, vol. 16, issue 1, 6

Abstract: This paper summarizes conclusions reached in Polachek and Xiang (International Organization, 2010). It shows how gains from trade decrease the probability of war in an incomplete information game. The result reaffirms how opportunity costs explain the inverse trade-conflict relationship found in current empirical literature on the subject. The ensuing discussion puts the result in the broader context of peacekeeping.

Keywords: incomplete information game; interdependence; gains from trade; conflict; peace-keeping (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010
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DOI: 10.2202/1554-8597.1188

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